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Every notion of deterrence with which I
am familiar depends upon the idea of a
credible threat; namely, that a threat will
be (a) understood, (b) feared, and ( c )
provoke a rational response to fear in the
threatened party. But the effect of threat-
induced fear on rationality cannot be taken
for granted. If it should be the case that
its effect is to impair rationality, deterrent
threats are open to serious question.
What, in fact, does fear do to rationality?
Fear has been studied extensively in the
psychological literature as a drive. Easter-
brook, (1) reviewing a large literature on
individual performance under drive, makes
an impressive case for the proposition that
the effect of increased drive on problem-
solving is to reduce the range of clues em-
ployed by the organism. If the clues neces-
sary for solution are indeed few, then in-
creased drive, by eliminating distracting
ones, may actually improve performance.
But as a problem becomes more complex,
the necessary clues increase along with the
number of rules for combining them. Per-
formance under high drive in such a situa-
tion is likely to be seriously impaired.
It appears that threats are becoming more
complex, for reasons that lie in the character
of modern war. If a threat fails and has to
be carried out, it is costly to both parties,
and modern weapons have made this cost
so high indeed that some strategists have
been looking for ways to retain the credibil-
ity of threat without incurring the costs (i.e.,
without absolutely having to deliver it).
Schelling (2) suggests &dquo;the threat that
leaves something to chance,&dquo; so that the
threatened party does not know whether a
threat will be fulfilled for any particular in-
fraction, since the threatener has surrendered
part of his control of the threat to some
chance device (e.g., &dquo;If you make me mad,
there’s no telling what I might do&dquo;). The
extreme threat of this sort is brinkmanship,
where all of the elements of threat, its
character, its probability, and the kind of
infractions for which it will be invoked are
left partly to chance.
I believe that the more a threat leaves
something to chance, the more complex
becomes the problem of understanding it.
Since there are more problematical features
in the threat, we present the other party
with a problem of more clues to consider.
But to the degree that our threat is success-
ful in arousing fear, it will narrow the range
of clues which the threatened party does
consider. I think it is not unfair to say that
it impairs his rationality. The deterrent out-
come of a threat may well become more
dubious, the more it succeeds in compelling
fear.
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